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Current and future sustainability challenges are increasingly acknowledged to be of a 
persistent and systemic nature. This gives rise to calls for likewise systemic solution 
strategies: Transformative system innovations instead of incremental system improvements, 
and societal transitions rather than procrastination on current locked-in trajectories. On these 
accounts, incremental change will not do. Still it proves difficult to achieve truly radical 
transformations. Insights from innovation theory, governance, sociology and critical theory 
help understand why radical transformation is unlikely to occur: Novelty, if it is to spread at 
all, should be acceptable to potential ‘adopters’, and should not be overly disruptive to 
existing practices. Initiatives should be radical enough to constitute transformative potential, 
but also shallow enough to be acceptable in current institutional constellations: This 
contradiction between transformation and non-disruption, the ‘paradox of acceptable novelty’, 
can be considered a key system innovation challenge. It is only paradoxical in its idealized 
form, however. System-innovative practices bring out various ways of dealing with the 
contradiction and its tradeoffs. This paper returns to the archetypical example of the more 
favorable case: The Trojan horse, the seemingly innocuous innovation with latent 
transformative force. Addressing its ambiguities, the concept’s practical relevance is elicited. 
Clever levers to systemic change may be devised, but inversely they may become 
‘domesticated’ and neutralized. Based on a comparative case study on innovation attempts in 
the Dutch traffic management field, it is shown how these two faces can even alternate. The 
‘incremental’ turn towards ‘network-oriented’ traffic management and the ‘radical’ call for 
the social sharing of space display an intriguing mixture of transformative and non-disruptive 
faces. Analyzed as sequences of ‘translations’, these cases help understand and deal with the 
ambiguities of Trojan horses. A dialectical approach to ‘acceptable novelty’ helps combine 
system-innovative idealism with Machiavellian agility.  
 
0 Introduction: The quest for system innovation and the paradox of acceptable novelty 
Current and future sustainability challenges are increasingly acknowledged to be of a 
particularly persistent and systemic nature. This gives rise to calls for likewise systemic 
solution strategies: Transformative system innovations instead of incremental system 
improvements, and societal transitions rather than procrastination on current locked-in 
trajectories (Rotmans, 2006, Loorbach, 2007, Grin et al., 2010). The quest for system 
innovation starts from the assumption that current sustainability challenges require radical and 
multidimensional transformations, integrally addressing cultures, structures and modus 
operandi. Studies into historical transitions and system innovations have brought out that such 
radical changes can unfold through various patterns and pathways. Different combinations of 
quasi-autonomous ‘landscape’ pressures, endogenous ‘regime’ tensions and challenging 
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novelties from ‘niches’ generate alternative evolutionary courses through which dominant 
‘regimes’ are transformed or replaced (Geels (2005), Geels & Schot (2007)). The ‘default’ 
pattern, the normal course of affairs, is systemic reproduction, however: Entrenched beliefs, 
practices and regulations selecting upon novelty, dominant structures change only marginally. 
They thus remain locked-in within their developmental trajectories. 
The calls for sustainable system innovation and transitions revive the (neo-)Marxist attention 
to structural, systemic pathologies (Horkheimer & Adorno (1981), de Vries (1993), Kelly 
(1994)). Similar to these accounts, incremental change is deemed insufficient. Reformism is 
rejected in favor of transformation, which is envisioned to take effect through co-evolutionary 
processes. Yet although the desired structural transformations have been noted to have 
occurred throughout history, and despite the work done to develop system-dynamic insight 
into management principles, in practice the quest for system innovation proves to run into 
considerable challenges. A growing literature into system innovation ‘in the making’ is 
helping to specify the difficulties of achieving truly radical transformations. Some of the 
striking phenomena reported are the ‘capture’, ‘domestication’ and ‘dilution’ of novelty by 
incumbent actors (Rotmans & Kemp (2009), Avelino (2009), Hendriks (2009), Voß et al., 
(2010)). These selective appropriations then lead to policy mixes in which novelty is 
intermingled with old policy ambitions. Hybridization is likely to occur (Heiskanen et al. 
(2009)), and system innovation champions are advised to anticipate ‘emergent incoherence’ 
(Kern & Howlett (2009)).    
Insights from innovation theory, governance, sociology and critical theory help understand 
why radical transformation is unlikely to occur: Novelty, if it is to spread at all, should be 
acceptable to potential ‘adopters’, and should not be overly disruptive to existing practices 
(Abernathy & Clark (1985), Tushman & Anderson (1986), Ferlie et al. (2005)). Disruption 
can take place in the form of competences and competitive assets lost, but can also manifest 
through policy alienation on the side of professionals involved (Tummers (2012)). And even 
when policy innovations are initially accepted as meaningful contributions, their relevance to 
adopters all too often diminishes over time (Teisman (2005)), or they fail to become 
consolidated as more than incidental experiments (van Buuren & Loorbach (2009)).  
With regard to system innovations, a class of innovations with particularly high 
transformation ambitions, the risk of excessive disruption is accordingly high, Grin (2010) 
indicates. The basic strategy is to nurture radical novelties in relatively secluded evolutionary 
‘niches’, at a distance from hostile selection environments. Preparing their breakthrough 
through experimentation and network formation, the next step is to seize the windows of 
opportunity opened through the internal tensions within and the external pressures on 
dominant ‘regime’ structures (Schot & Geels (2008)). Depending on these circumstances, 
disruptive innovations could thus break through nevertheless. Still, reflecting upon empirical 
examples in eco-housing and organic food, Smith (2007) stresses that the problem of 
disruptive innovation cannot be circumvented altogether. The intended normalization or 
‘mainstreaming’ of radical innovations by vanguard ‘frontrunners’ involves a manifold of 
sometimes subtle alterations: In the process of domesticating ‘wild’ innovations, rough edges 
have to be smoothened to have them ‘slot in’ with a formalized and regulated institutional 
environment. In other words, notwithstanding the stepwise and systemically informed 
approach to radical innovation, attempts at system innovation remain confronted with the 
paradox of acceptable novelty: Initiatives contributing to system innovations should be radical 
enough to constitute transformative potential, but also shallow enough to be acceptable in 
current institutional constellations.  
The contradiction between transformation and non-disruption can be considered a key system 
innovation paradox. Yet in itself this is rather underwhelming news. First, the paradox has 
been formulated earlier in different but similar contexts. Second, as Meadowcroft (2009) 
expressed it tellingly, it is hardly counterintuitive that attempts at societal transformation
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become subject to politics, negotiation, and tradeoff: “When have policy directions—even 
those that officially espouse change, openness, and participation— entirely escaped the orbit 
of economic and political power? It is entirely understandable that transition-management-
in-practice looks a bit more like policy-as-usual than would be recommended by transition-
management-in-theory. What is surprising is that an idea that explicitly talks of system 
change ever got adopted into official circles in the first place.” (336) In other words, having 
established the paradox of acceptable novelty as a key challenge to system innovation 
endeavors, this is only an intermediate conclusion. The paradox should be considered as a 
stepping stone towards more specific questions and empirically informed answers. How can 
this paradox be dealt with? And, considering that it is only paradoxical in its idealized form, 
how to strike a balance between non-disruption and transformation?    
These questions will be answered as follows: First the paradox is dismantled somewhat, 
restating the apparent logical contradiction as a practical dilemma. Addressing the practice of 
paradox, this paper invokes the archetypical example of the more favorable case: The Trojan 
horse, the seemingly innocuous innovation with latent transformative force. Of particular 
interest is the ambiguity inherent to Trojan horses: They may be clever levers to systemic 
change, but inversely they may become ‘domesticated’ and neutralized. Following 
methodological guidelines from the sociology of translations, empirical investigation focuses 
on the interpretive flexibility inherent to Trojan horses. Concrete system innovation practices 
are analyzed as sequences of ‘translations’ (section 1). Next, the ambiguities of Trojan horses 
are shown as they occurred in system-innovative practices. Empirical analysis is based on 
comparative case study into innovation attempts in the Dutch traffic management field (Pel, 
2012). Highlighted are the striking similarities between two otherwise different innovation 
attempts: The seemingly ‘incremental’ turn towards ‘network-oriented’ traffic management 
(section 2) and the apparently radical call for the social sharing of space (section 3) display 
an intriguing mixture of transformative and non-disruptive faces. Of particular interest to 
system innovation practice is the alternation between those faces. In the conclusion the cases 
are compared on key dimensions, thereby eliciting the ambiguities of Trojan horses. On this 
basis it is argued that the paradox of acceptable novelty should be handled with a dialectical 
approach. Such approach helps to combine system-innovative idealism with Machiavellian 
agility (section 4). 
1 The Trojan horse – between silent transformation and domestication 
The ‘paradox of acceptable novelty’ is a nagging challenge to system-innovative endeavors. 
Formulated as a paradox the challenge is portrayed as insoluble, however. Instead, the 
paradox can be made productive by realizing that the apparent logical contradiction is rather a 
practical tension (Poole & van de Ven (1989)). Treating ‘acceptable novelty’ as an innovation 
dilemma, it becomes tractable as an empirical phenomenon. It then becomes apparent that 
more and less favorable balances can be struck between transformative innovation on the one 
hand, and the avoidance of disruption on the other: Not accidentally, the very quest for system 
innovation and transitions is underpinned and encouraged by systemic-historical analyses that 
show such transformations to be possible and retraceable.  
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A most inspiring example of purposive transformation is Edison’s3 legendary introduction of 
incandescent lighting. His efforts and ruses to conquer and transform a dominant constellation 
based on gas light have been exemplars for several innovation-theoretical insights. Amongst 
the various studies on this case, the analysis of Hargadon & Douglas (2001) is particularly 
insightful for present purposes. They elicit how the deeply entrenched gas light ‘regime’ 
could be invaded and supplanted through what they call ‘robust design’: “..an innovation's 
design is robust when its arrangement of concrete details are immediately effective in locating 
the novel product or process within the familiar world, by invoking valued schemas and 
scripts, yet preserve the flexibility necessary for future evolution, by not constraining the 
potential evolution of understanding and action that follows use. To strike this balance, 
prospective innovators must carefully choose designs that couch some features in the familiar, 
present others as new, and keep still others hidden from view.” (479/480). Disregarding the 
details of Edison’s design process and focusing on the above theoretical characterization, the 
‘robust design’ concept indicates a particularly successful way of dealing with ‘acceptable 
novelty’. On the one hand, the paradox can be dealt with successfully by invoking familiar 
schemas and scripts. This helps evade the trap of inviting resistance against apparent 
disruption. On the other hand, familiarity should not be built in to the extent that 
transformative novelty is sacrificed altogether. The authors nicely describe how Edison did 
not triumph over the gas industry by “…clearly distinguishing his new system from, but, 
rather, by initially cloaking it in the mantle of these established institutions” (479).  
From the perspective of dealing with ‘acceptable novelty’, the most interesting element in 
Hargadon & Douglas’ analysis is the strategic cunning involved. Apparently, Edison struck a 
most favorable balance between innovation and acceptability (non-disruption). It even seems 
as if he transcended the paradox, defying its logic. As indicated above, to clearly distinguish 
the revolutionary lighting system from its well-positioned competitor would have amounted to 
an unfavorable balance – such would only have increased mistrust against an already fragile 
innovation attempt (occasional flaws in the electrical wiring did cause several lethal accidents, 
for example). Instead, Edison ‘cloaked his innovation in the mantle of the established 
institutions’, affording it with a relatively innocuous, not overly revolutionary, appearance.  
Edison’s ruse poses a preliminary answer to the question of how to deal with ‘acceptable 
novelty’. The concept of ‘robust design’ offers a crisp formulation of the ‘working substance’ 
in this process, but in this context such specification is somewhat premature – the concept 
indicates a favorable kind of dealing with ‘acceptable novelty’, but does not fully articulate 
the ambiguities involved. Instead of specifying Edison’s ruse, it is therefore more useful to 
generalize it. This allows to describe and interrelate both the favorable and the less fortunate 
dealings with the innovation dilemma. Remembering the trick of ‘cloaking’ the innovation, it 
is not difficult to come up with such a general concept. The concept antedates Edison by far: 
The Trojan horse. 
The Trojan horse is the archetypical strategic disguise of true intentions. The mythos stems 
from the Trojan war. On most accounts it was Odysseus who sought to forge a breakthrough 
in the thus far fruitless siege of Troy. The literal breakthrough through Trojan city walls was 
increasingly unlikely to come about by brute force however, the protagonists came to 
acknowledge. Instead, the Greeks came with their famous gift: The giant wooden horse. It 
was attractive for the Trojans to bring home, as this would gain the divine favor and 
protection of Pallas Athena. The horse did require the Trojans to bring down their city walls, 
however. The Greeks had made sure it did not fit through the fortress’ main entrance. Finally, 
                                                                        
3
 As has often been stressed, Edison did by no means work alone and relied on a network of innovators. For the 
present discussion this nuance is of no direct relevance, however.  
once the horse had been eagerly hauled in by the Trojans, the Greeks played their biggest 
trump: In the night, soldiers came out of the horse in which they were hiding, and opened the 
city gates for their comrades. 
The Trojan horse (or ‘Greek gift’) is a classical metaphor, invoked to symbolize a wide range 
of somehow deceitful strategies. With regard to the ‘acceptable novelty’ dilemma in system 
innovation, this rich metaphor offers a lens that is attractive for the following reasons: 
1. The metaphor articulates how the quest for system innovation seeks to transform societal 
structures primarily through innovation rather than destruction. System innovation 
develops, and offers.  
2. The metaphor articulates the system-innovative awareness that a straightforward siege of 
locked-in societal structures is bound to run up against fortified city walls, i.e. resistance 
to disruptive change on the side of vested interests, dominant beliefs and established 
routines. As indicated by Stirling (2011, 84), the quest for system innovation should 
even start from a more fundamental acknowledgement that many initiators of change 
hold subaltern positions. This increases the practical relevance of Trojan horses, i.e. of 
seemingly innocuous innovation with latent transformative force.  
3. The metaphor is applicable to various dimensions of systemic innovation: Whereas 
Hargadon & Douglas’ (2001) ‘robust design’ seems to refer primarily to new 
technologies and objects, the Trojan horse could refer to any of the innovations in 
products, processes, institutional arrangements, beliefs and infrastructures that the 
system innovation concept contains. 
4. The metaphor helps organize and interrelate the various patterns distinguished in studies 
on ‘system innovation in the making’. As briefly discussed in section 1, system-
innovative ventures are frequently noted to be ‘captured’, ‘domesticated’, ‘diluted’, in 
the more favorable cases they break through, take off, or become scaled up, and then 
there are the intermediate cases and ‘hybridizations’. Through the mythos’ richness, 
these patterns can be reformulated as alternative ‘Greek gift’ scenarios.  
5. Following up on 4), the metaphor contains a considerable ambiguity that is not obvious 
at first sight. As emphasized in the heroic story, the apparently non-disruptive horse 
yielded relatively silent transformation. Yet on a less heroic, more sober and more 
strategic interpretation, the Greek breakthrough attempt could also have taken an 
entirely different turn. There is also the inverse possibility of ‘capture’ and 
‘domestication’, in which the system-innovation champions are outsmarted as it were: 
Their horse is accepted, but neutralized or assimilated thereafter
4
. In other words, the 
Trojan horse metaphor need not be taken to dissolve the innovation paradox by striking a 
particular balance. On this broader interpretation it rather embodies or contains it.  
Emphasizing the ambiguity implied with the concept, the Trojan horse metaphor can cover 
the entire spectrum between silent transformation and domestication. As such it offers a lens 
through which to gain understanding of the ‘acceptable novelty’ paradox as it occurs in 
concrete system innovation processes. In order to deal with this paradox/dilemma effectively, 
a greater affinity with its ambiguities seems prerequisite. In the following sections two cases 
are briefly presented. They are cases of attempts at system innovation and their subsequent 
innovation processes. Particularly insightful about the cases is not only their display of both 
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‘silent transformation’ and ‘domestication’, but moreover, the apparent alternation between 
these two faces. That alternation is a key to answering the central questions on ‘acceptable 
novelty’.  
The two cases are lifted out from a quadruple-case study in the Dutch traffic management 
field, as contrasting examples. The underlying research, a four-year dissertation project, is 
documented extensively in Pel (2012). The research was concerned with ‘system innovation 
in the making’: Paying particular attention to the system understandings of involved actors, 
system innovation was studied from within, rather than from a transcendental, synoptic 
perspective. To paraphrase Yanow (1997), this involved investigating ‘how an attempt at 
system innovation means’ to diverse actors. Following methodological guidelines from the 
sociology of translation (Callon & Law (1982), Star & Griesemer (1989), Bijker & Law 
(1992), Akrich et al. (2002
a,b
), Latour (2005)), it was reconstructed
5
 how system innovation 
achievements can emerge from the diverse translations of an innovation attempt. An 
innovation is waged by an actor with a particular system understanding and ambitions, then it 
is embraced, modified or resisted by various others, and in the end translation sequences can 
be carved out that display particular translation-dynamic patterns. Development of these 
patterns was aided by a sensitizing translation typology. These translation-dynamic patterns, 
developed through both ‘intrinsic’ case analysis and case comparison, formed the basis for a 
generalization of findings: The following two cases thus constitute exemplars, whilst the 
‘Trojan theme’ itself emerged from a more encompassing analysis.  
Originally analyzed as translation sequences, the following cases display particular sensitivity 
towards the ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Bijker & Law, 1992) of innovation attempts. In this 
constructivist approach, the question raised is not so much if, and to what extent, an 
innovation attempt possessed Trojan horse-properties. Attention does not go out only to the 
clever ‘Greeks’, but to the ‘Trojans’ as well – who may turn out to be no less clever in the 
particular case. Moreover, the cases involve multiple actors who are generally not at ‘war’ 
with each other. Building analysis on a metaphor, these differences from the original mythos 
must be kept in mind
6
. Yet whereas the multi-actor setting may confuse the similarity between 
the Greek-Trojan battle and the more complex negotiation processes at issue, it displays even 
stronger how Odysseus’ ruse relied on interpretation: The horse had to seem non-disruptive 
and attractive, and this attractiveness
7
 differs according to system understanding and time. In 
section 2 it is described how a seemingly ‘incremental’ innovation attempt held a latent 
revolutionary spark, and in section 3 an attempt is described that poses rather its mirror 
image: Apparent radicalism may have been deceiving in the latter case. After a brief 
description of the cases, their key characteristics are discussed. Following the ‘Trojan theme’, 
analysis concerns the following elements. First it is specified what transformation the 
initiators sought to bring about and, second, the disruption implied with this ambition. Next, 
the affirmative and negating translations show whether key actors found the innovation 
disruptive or not, and how they appropriated and modified it. Fifth, it is verified how the cases 
resemble or differ from the ‘Greek gift’ archetype of latent transformation. What was hidden 
from view by initiators? And, remembering that others may do their share in deceitfulness as 
well, what was hidden from view by translators?  
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2 The revolutionary spark of network-oriented traffic management and transport policy  
This case concerns an attempt, or in fact a cluster of attempts, to arrive at an integrated way of 
dealing with transport flows. In 2003 a ministerial commission delivered its advisory report 
‘Movement through cooperation’. This ‘Luteijn’ commission, named after its chairman, 
consisted of high-ranked officials from both public and private sectors. Its mission had been 
to address the accessibility problems on the A4 highway as they occurred especially in the 
Greater the Hague area. More specifically, the commission was to develop further the concept 
of a ‘mobility market’, addressing not only the supply of transport solutions but also the 
demand for travel. During the commission’s deliberations the associated road pricing schemes 
perished in a heated political debate, however, which limited its scope somewhat. The report 
retained the initial ambition towards integration, however. Its key message read that the A4 
highway issue should no longer be treated as a transport axis problem, but rather as a problem 
of network malfunctioning. A4 accessibility could be understood only through the commuting 
flows in the entire surrounding metropolitan area. This ‘network problem’ crucially required 
integral management, the report read. However, the network was noted to be fragmented into 
a large number of central and decentralized government agencies, various public transport 
operators, and a private sector that hardly acknowledged its role in the generation of traffic 
flows. The proposed solution strategy aimed to carefully build up the requisite integration, 
reminding the targeted actors that ‘to the road user, administrative boundaries are irrelevant’. 
The commission established a growth model that specified several clusters of ‘network-
oriented’ measures, the easy picks within which would create the trust for the more 
challenging ones. The model would be tested through a pilot in the Greater the Hague area.  
 
The ‘Luteijn approach’ became a national benchmark for integrated transport policy and 
‘area-oriented’ traffic management. The Greater the Hague pilot yielded a variety of effective 
collaborations and innovative transport solutions, which in turn inspired similar initiatives in 
other regions. All in all these initiatives can be summarized under the ‘network turn’, for their 
common rationale that ‘to the road user, administrative boundaries are relevant’. The system-
innovative importance of this ‘network turn’ resides in the shift towards an integrated, 
system-responsive approach to mobility problems, often involving the ever-contested 
application of demand management as well. The innovation attempt, or rather the family of 
network-oriented innovation attempts, was successful: The network-oriented way of thinking 
became a standard in Dutch transport and traffic management policies, and the integrated 
approach spurred various transport innovations in turn.  
 
Typical for the translation sequence as a whole was the range of innovative projects that were 
undertaken as boundary-transgressing collaborations. This involved coordinated slippery road 
abatement, an experiment with the opening and closing regime of bridges, coordinated 
incident management, an open tendering procedure for private-sector traffic information 
services, area-oriented optimization of traffic light cycles, the development of a methodic for 
area-oriented traffic management and its multiple applications, an ‘inverse pricing’ 
experiment with Rush Hour Avoidance, the introduction of the ‘mobility broker’ and related 
initiatives to self-regulate traffic-generation, the ‘traffic mariner’ arrangement to coordinate 
the operational challenges of immediate traffic problem-solving, and schemes for joint 
infrastructure financing and the associated bids for national-level support.  
 
Appreciated in terms of the ‘acceptable novelty’ dilemma, the ‘network turn’ process  
displays a striking similarity to the Trojan horse theme. A closer look at some key 
characteristics allows to substantiate this. First of all, it is good to specify the ‘city walls under 
siege’: What was the transformative content of the attempted innovation, and what disruption 
was implied with this ambition? In this respect the ‘Luteijn’ commission can be seen to aim 
for a more integrated, boundary-crossing and system-oriented approach to traffic management 
and transport policy. The commission convincingly laid down the functional rationale for this, 
which was hard to object against. Still, the argued irrelevance of administrative boundaries 
implied a disruption of existing practices and discretions, of territorial logic. In that respect it 
can be said that the commission was in need for nothing less than a Trojan horse construction; 
they were facing particularly solid ‘city walls’.  
      
This prompts the question of how their plan for network-oriented action was received by key 
translators. Did they find it disruptive? How did they appropriate it, and select upon it? The 
translation process involved a myriad of actors, it needs to be emphasized: Administrators at 
municipal, metropolitan and provincial levels, traffic professionals, ‘mobility managers’ who 
were appointed to guide boundary-crossing action, and various private sector actors such as 
employers and entrepreneurs. Yet however large and diverse the group of translators, it is 
striking that fairly little disruption was experienced, and moreover, that the innovation was 
often hauled in eagerly: To some, the proposed ‘network turn’ was significant especially as an 
effective traffic solution. Especially the content-oriented traffic professionals saw it as an 
opportunity for ‘serious’, well-founded and integral management of traffic. They applied the 
‘network logic’ in regional ‘network analyses’ and traffic scenarios, emphasizing the added 
value of this system-oriented line of reasoning. By contrast, administrators, managers and 
consultants were somewhat less impressed by the content-driven logic itself. To them the 
demarcation of a particular road network and the establishment of attendant network 
challenges remained a deeply political issue – let alone the implementation and financing. In 
this translation the ‘network turn’ revolved not so much around the diagnosis and resolution 
of road network problems. Instead, the network logic was rather a lever for fruitful 
cooperation and generation of trust, and a way of thinking through which to establish shared 
problem ownership. Furthermore, ‘network action’ was generally applauded by private sector 
actors. From their perspective, the initiative was welcome as an effort to reduce ‘red tape’, 
overcome fragmentation and arrive at a more forceful management of congestion problems. 
Moreover, the fresh approach offered opportunities for entrepreneurs to show their innovative 
capacities, and its deliberative set-up could be used for lobbying purposes. On the other hand, 
the gains from network-oriented actions were not equally clear to all translators, and their 
active endorsements changed over time: Conflicting interests resurfaced once network plans 
were elaborated, responsiveness to the own constituency remained important, the gains of 
coordination were not of equal relevance to all, conflicting interests were difficult to settle in 
the informal arrangements, and the election cycle made it difficult to sustain the trusting 
relationships on which network action rested.    
 
Apparently, the ‘network idea’ was not received as particularly disruptive. This summary 
statement raises the crucial question of how the case resembled the ‘Greek gift’ archetype of 
latent transformation. What was hidden from view by initiators? And what was hidden from 
view by translators? Regarding the first, it can be said that the initiators of ‘networked action’ 
managed to present it as a fairly ‘incremental’, non-disruptive innovation. Intended network 
collaborators were primarily presented with effective solutions and quick wins to the shared 
problem of congestion. And whereas the advocated ‘network action’ could have been taken as 
a threat to discretions and administrative autonomy, this element of the innovation remained 
largely implicit in the informal network arrangements made. Indeed, one of the key 
trailblazers indicated this to be the trick behind their growth model: Any hint at the 
establishment of a new ‘Transport Authority’ was carefully avoided, yet this was where they 
were heading towards. As far as they successfully hid the ‘revolutionary spark’, the ‘Luteijn’ 
protagonists can thus be said to have arrived at a system-innovative Trojan horse. On the 
other hand, the translation process reveals as well that the actors targeted for network action 
did not simply fall for the trick: The network logic was generally hauled in enthusiastically, 
but behind this endorsement there were also the subtle twists that deflected the revolutionary 
spark somewhat. Next to the network logic, the territorial logic continued to hold sway, and in 
fact the first could be mobilized to serve the latter – the definition of the network and its 
problems remained a deliberative practice, after all. 
 
To conclude, the ‘network turn’ can be considered a contemporary example of the Trojan 
horse ploy. Yet beyond this assessment of favorable balancing between transformation and 
disruption, there is the more intricate story of mutual latencies: At times the intended Trojan 
horse was also domesticated, deflecting locally unwanted transformations.        .                   
  
3 The domestication of Shared Space radicalism 
This case concerns an attempt to reconfigure the road network towards a more ‘humane’ 
traffic order, also seeking to restore the balance between spatial quality and traffic concerns. 
Shared Space became internationally known as a daring and intriguing concept to roll back 
traffic management, in favor of a less regulated, more ‘democratic’ and more attractive public 
space. One of the earlier showcases for the emblem was the Haren town center reconstruction, 
involving a much-debated shift towards mixing of traffic modes. Together with similar 
schemes at other sites this led to a Shared Space approach. The approach was laid down in 
booklets, applied in an EU-Interreg project, further developed in a Shared Space institute, 
embedded in traffic-related curricula, discussed with traffic safety experts and applied at 
various sites in both the Netherlands and abroad. Meanwhile the intriguing concept of ‘safety 
through chaos’ was eagerly disseminated through various media, not in the least because of 
the missionary work by its late standard bearer Hans Monderman and his network of 
advocates. A series of inconspicuous road reconstructions was welded into a well-known 
‘brand’; in this respect the innovation attempt can be considered successful. On the other 
hand, in many cases the radical concept materialized in rather watered-down fashion.      
 
The Shared Space translation sequence displays widely diverging translations that initially 
proved hard to reconcile. In this respect the Haren town center reconstruction acts as a pars 
pro toto: The officials from local government and their alderman enthusiastically embraced 
the plans to ‘mix traffic’, which had been developed in a series of participatory design 
sessions with citizens. To them it was an innovative way to deal with traffic, while 
simultaneously ensuring an upgraded town centre – the main road no longer divided the town 
center in two. On the other hand, the plan met with considerable resistance from various 
stakeholder groups: The large group of elderly citizens felt threatened by the plans to do away 
with the separate bicycle lanes and the suggestion to negotiate traffic order amongst road 
users. Similarly, parents felt insecure about the safety of their children, and the bicyclist’s 
association deplored the removal of separate bicycle lanes; their hard-fought achievement in 
the struggle with car-dominated traffic. Also the police forces were less than enthusiastic, 
considering that the deregulating approach robbed of them the legal ground for enforcement. 
Similar translation dynamics can be seen more broadly; established traffic institutes warned 
that the ‘safety through chaos’ principle had yet to prove itself. According to them its 
application better be restricted to ‘dwelling areas’ with low traffic intensities, in line with 
existing guidelines. Others were less concerned about the questions about traffic safety, and 
emphasized that Shared Space’s removal of traffic signs and insistence on the ‘self-explaining 
road’ made for more attractive places and empowered citizens.  
 
Shared Space acquired fame and notoriety primarily for its ‘safety through chaos’ principle, 
the controversial idea that traffic order should rely more on the self-organizing capacities of 
citizens. This often led to unresolved battles from entrenched positions – some emphasized 
the vulnerability of non-motorized road users, others emphasized their resilience and capacity 
for improvisation. The Shared Space initiators found that an important aspect of their concept 
had become ‘lost in translation’, however. The concept had never been meant as recipe for 
management of traffic, they held. At least as important was their argument for shared spatial 
design: Shared Space was also a way of negotiating space, of participative and 
interdisciplinary design and of exploring ways to share space. The ‘traffic solution’ 
translations neglected that the concept involved more than traffic. The partners in the EU-
Interreg Shared Space program, reflecting on their experiences and the compromises made, 
laid this down in a second official publication. In this ‘from project to process’ booklet they 
effectively argued for a ‘process turn’, asserting the primacy of the participative design 
process over the implementation of traffic solutions. The earlier iconoclasm against the 
dominant traffic safety doctrine was toned down, and instead Shared Space was presented 
more and more as a model for participative governance. They took to a synchronization 
strategy, seeking to attune different conceptions of sharing space. This can be seen in the 
deliberative processes started from the Shared Space institute, the research and education 
projects conducted with polytechnics, and also in the later discussions about future Shared 
Space application in Haren. Highly symbolic value is the research project undertaken in 
collaboration with an organization for the visually impaired: This group of particularly 
vulnerable road users, evidently less capable of negotiating traffic order through eye contact, 
had initially been overlooked by the enthusiastic innovators. The research project shows a 
shared scanning of the concrete challenges and opportunities. The ‘safety through chaos’ 
principle is subject to joint fact finding, which may bring forward new ways to share space. 
The ‘process turn’ made Shared Space into a more flexible concept, revolving around the 
sharing of space.    
 
Appreciated in terms of ‘acceptable novelty’, Shared Space displays hardly any resemblance 
to the Trojan horse, as the ‘network turn’ case did. Instead, it even appears to involve its 
inverse, the series of not that spectacular transformations being donned in a radical storyline. 
In order to develop this assessment further, the first question to answer is the following: What 
was the transformative content of the attempted innovation, and what disruption was implied 
with this ambition? In this respect it needs to be remembered that Shared Space is juxtaposed 
against divided space. The concept was aimed to roll back the partitioning of public space 
through traffic engineering measures, in favor of more ‘humane’, more democratic and more 
appealing public space. In order to bring this about, the concept implied an argument for road 
design that was more participative and political, and less guided by traffic safety doctrines. 
Especially as regarding the traffic safety doctrine Shared Space was overtly and purposively 
disruptive – the ‘safety through chaos’ principle implied a provocative stance towards a well-
established sector and common beliefs about traffic safety.   
 
The disruptiveness of Shared Space did not go unnoticed. As speaks from the receptions by 
traffic safety institutes, traffic professionals and the police, the ‘safety through chaos’ 
principle met with concerns, serious objections and sometimes even derision. And apart from 
disruption of professional practices and standards, various spokespersons of ‘vulnerable road 
users’ (the elderly, children and bicyclists) equally translated the concept as an erosion of 
achievements in traffic safety. In Haren Shared Space took away the separate bicycle lanes 
that secured bicyclists their protective space; other than the Greeks, the Shared Space 
protagonists seemed to take, rather than offer. Still, the anarchist storyline of ‘safety through 
chaos’ and the appeal to common sense and decency gained considerable media coverage and 
public attention. So however great the resistance against the ‘irresponsible’ traffic concept, its 
iconoclasm did pay off in terms of attention and ‘rumor around the brand’. To consider 
Shared Space as mere iconoclasm would only grasp the surface of the concept however, the 
initiators held. As also critics had pointed out, Shared Space never amounted to complete 
eradication of traffic ordering in practice: Traffic and livelihood ambitions were always 
rebalanced, rather than substituted, and the eventual designs were generally rather 
inconspicuous compared to the radicalism surrounding the guiding concept. Compromises 
were made to make Shared Space less disruptive to road users, and more acceptable. The 
‘process turn’ clearly displays a further emphasis on the avoidance of disruption, refocusing 
on the negotiation of acceptable ways to share space. 
 
Shared Space iconoclasm could not actually break through the ‘city walls’ of traffic safety 
doctrine, even when the concept managed to mobilize forces. When materializing, it always 
involved domestication of the rather ‘wild’ idea. In that respect the later ‘process turn’ 
towards negotiation of space can be considered more as a confirmation of ongoing practice 
than as a major change of direction: De facto domestication was acknowledged and 
anticipated upon. On the other hand, the ‘process turn’ was a strategic repositioning that 
explicitly seeks to strike a balance in the ‘acceptable novelty’ dilemma. Upfront, the case has 
been characterized as the inverse of the ‘Greek gift’: In this regard the following questions 
were raised beforehand: What was hidden from view by initiators? And what was hidden from 
view by translators? The main answer is then that, indeed, there was no latent transformation, 
but rather domestication of overt and even provocatively formulated transformative 
ambitions. Yet when taking account the later ‘process turn’, things are less clear: It can be 
said that the initiators took to a ‘Greek gift’ strategy after all, in the sense that they 
downplayed and hid Shared Space anarchism.   
 
To conclude, the domestication of Shared Space radicalism indicates not just how a radical 
innovation attempt became diluted through translators – the case also shows that the 
iconoclasm was rather a surface dimension of the concept that was first exploited and later 
discarded. It can therefore be concluded that, first, the initial ‘inversal’ of the ‘Greek gift’ was 
not as strategically naïve as it may appear, and secondly, that a Trojan horse-strategy was 
adopted over time. In the next and concluding section the cases are briefly compared, also 
seeking to establish what lessons they convey for practical dealings with the ‘acceptable 
novelty’ paradox.                
 
4 Conclusion and discussion of findings: A dialectical approach to the paradox of 
‘acceptable novelty’  
As argued in the first section, the paradox of ‘acceptable novelty’ is a crucial challenge to 
system innovation practice. Stated as a paradox, the tension between the contradicting 
ambitions of non-disruption/acceptance and transformation is indicated to be inherent, and 
unavoidable, to some extent. On the other hand, the indicated logical contradiction needs to be 
acknowledged as a tractable issue, as a practical dilemma. Having described and analyzed two 
cases of system innovation processes, it has only become more clear that the dilemma can be 
dealt with in a variety of ways. Table 1 below summarizes the cases on the key dimensions of 
transformative content, disruptions implied, affirmative and negating translations, and 
patterns in latency. Comparison on these ‘Greek gift’ dimensions then allows to formulate 
answers to the practice-oriented questions on the ‘acceptable novelty’ paradox:  
How can this paradox be dealt with? And, considering that it is only paradoxical in its 
idealized form, how to strike a balance between non-disruption and transformation?   
Table 1 Case comparison on ‘Trojan horse’ dimensions 
 ‘Network turn’ Shared Space 
Transformative content  
(system-innovative 
ambition) 
Towards integrated, network-
oriented mobility policies; 
boundary-crossing action 
Towards more ‘humane’, more 
democratic and self-organizing traffic 
order and spatial design; participative 
design. 
Disruption implied (how is 
existing system affected?)  
Break away from territorial 
logic; undermining 
administrative autonomy. 
Against traffic safety code, 
jeopardizing traffic safety certainties  
Affirmative translations 
(why/how was innovation 
attempt accepted?) 
Quick wins and innovative 
transport solutions; sometimes 
in line with territorial logic 
Appealing iconoclasm; acceptable 
traffic innovations 
Negating translations  
(why/ how was innovation 
attempt experienced as 
disruptive?) 
Network logic not always 
relevant/beneficial; 
interference with discretions 
Iconoclasm 
‘irresponsible’/unfeasible; 
‘vulnerable road users’ neglected 
Patterns in latency (what 
was hidden from view by 
initiators? What was hidden 
from view by translators?) 
Integrated Transport Authority 
hidden from translators; 
accommodation & 
domestication  hidden from 
initiators 
Overt iconoclasm downplayed at 
later stage;  Translators domesticated 
the radical concept 
 
Overlooking these case summaries and thinking through the cases’ similarities and differences 
from the Trojan horse theme, the following conclusions can be drawn: First of all, the cases 
are very different in the nature of the transformation envisioned by the initiators. Whereas the 
first involves fairly incremental change, in the sense that primarily the means to congestion 
abatement were changed rather than this goal itself, the second involves a more fundamental 
reconsideration of traffic management practices. Accordingly, the first innovation attempt can 
be considered to imply relatively less disruption. The two cases’ translation dynamics largely 
confirm this. The second conclusion, however, is that the two innovation attempts do not fit a 
clear-cut juxtaposition of incremental-radical innovation. On the one hand, the ‘network turn’ 
seemed not overly disruptive to most translators but did contain a revolutionary spark. On the 
other hand, Shared Space was quite radical in its iconoclastic storyline, but both initiators and 
translators domesticated the concept somewhat. Both ‘network turn’ and Shared Space 
initiatives functioned as ‘boundary objects’ (Star & Griesemer (1989): More than their 
differences, i.e. their presumed intrinsic radical or incremental nature, their common 
malleability stands out.   
Having indicated the malleability of the respective innovative concepts, the Trojan horse 
theme comes to life. The third conclusion is then that the two cases do not so much constitute 
a contemporary Trojan horse and its apparent inverse of overt confrontation, but rather two 
cases in which non-disruptive and transformative alternated. The Trojan horse-construction of 
latent transformation was in-built in the ‘network turn’ case, but translators countered any 
overly transformative materializations of the concept. In the Shared Space case, the Trojan-
horse strategy was only chosen later - after confrontational rhetoric had done its work for the 
initiators. The general picture that arises is one of malleable innovation attempts that are 
constantly reinterpreted and slightly altered according to circumstances. Unlike the original 
mythos, both initiators and translators play tricks on each other. Both latent transformation 
and latent domestication are passing moments in translation
8
.       
The above observations and conclusions lead, as far as this can be done on the basis of a small 
number of cases, to the main contention of this paper: The paradox of ‘acceptable novelty’ 
needs to be appreciated as a practical contradiction between transformation and non-
disruption, and, because of the interpretive flexibility of innovation attempts, this 
contradiction is of a highly dynamic nature. Once applied to system innovation processes, the 
Trojan horse metaphor instructively showed what is missing in the original mythos: Instead of 
a simple case of masterful deceit by the Greeks, there were rather mutual tricks and twists; 
and instead of a breakthrough that happened overnight, there were rather prolonged strategic 
games around the innovation attempt – the Trojan horse was offered, returned, and offered 
again, each time with new latent content. In other words, the Trojan horse metaphor has 
helped elicit that the paradox of ‘acceptable novelty’ should be appreciated through a 
dialectical perspective. This entails practically that system-innovative endeavors should not 
be blinded by transitory moments of acceptance or rejection, or by the ‘incremental’ or 
‘radical’ nature of their innovative concept9. Instead, innovators should rather be attentive to 
the sometimes subtle ‘idea mutations’ in their innovative concept over time (Dudley (2003, 
437)), and to the changes in circumstances under which Trojan horses can gain and lose in 
transformative force
10
. On this dialectical account, the completion of a Trojan horse is only 
the beginning of a process of system-innovative action, in which the latent ambitions of 
translators have to be anticipated (see also Luhmann (1997), Grin & van Staveren (2007)). 
Whether the process will eventually turn out as the intended latent transformation, or as 
neutralizing domestication instead (see for example de Coninck (2007) and Meadowcroft 
(2009) on the apparent Trojan horse of Carbon Capture & Storage), depends on sustained 
efforts to keep the innovation acceptable and to maintain latency – the ‘Luteijn’ growth model 
can be considered a good example of this. These co-steering adjustments ‘from within’ a clew 
of translators can be considered opportunistic or Machiavellian (Rip (2006)) – system-
innovative idealism remains present however, in the form of latencies.             
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